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Misconduct of the Trial Attorney
William L. Libby*
E VERY SOCIAL GROUP DEPENDS upon some standard of correct
behavior of its members. Particularly, professional groups
have codified acceptable modes of conduct. Lawyers have done
this by statute, court decisions, and Canons of Professional
Ethics. For varying reasons, the standards of conduct are not
always self-imposed, but sometimes are created by pressures
of the general public.
Charles Dickens saw many abuses in the English courts in
his time. He was particularly irritated by the way witnesses
were handled by attorneys at trial. Several of his works' de-
scribe the badgering that witnesses had to withstand from coun-
sel. Today, many former abuses have disappeared. Yet, today,
a court record may speak of counsel's conduct as being "im-
proper," "wrong," "misconduct," conduct "involving moral
turpitude," "in error," or creating "passion and prejudice."
An attorney is licensed and is sworn as an officer of the
court. Common law proclaims him to be a "minister of justice
in aid of the court."'2 Attorneys are the chief instruments of the
Anglo-American system of law.3 An attorney at a trial is not
a contestant like unto a gladiator seeking to prevail at any cost.
4
His cause of action, as well as his opponent's, depends upon
a fair and impartially conducted trial. The jury's verdict should
be based upon the issues made by the pleadings and evidence,
and not upon deceptions created by misconduct. 5
* B.A., Ohio Wesleyan University; a Senior at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School.
1 Dickens, Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club (New York, Modem
Library Edition, 1958); Ibid., Bleak House (New York, Heritage Press,
1942).
2 Turner v. Abin, 118 Ohio St. 527, 533, 161 N. E. 792 (1928); Cancellieri v.
De Modica, 57 N. J. Super. 598, 155 A. 2d 167, 170 (1959); In re Estate of
Wright v. Persky, 123 N. E. 2d 52, 56 (Ohio App., 1954); In re McBride,
164 Ohio St. 419, 132 N. E. 2d 115 (1956).
3 Turner v. Abin, supra, note 2.
4 Jones v. Macedonia-Northfield Banking Co., 132 Ohio St. 341, 350, 7 N. E.
2d 544 (1937).
5 Oslund v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ass'n., 242 F. 2d 813 (9th Cir.,
1957); Critcher v. Fick, 315 S. W. 2d 421 (Mo., 1958).
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Discretionary Power of the Court
Trial courts have broad inherent and statutory powers.
6
These powers include the power to prevent misconduct with
or towards a witness. Statutes7 enable the court to suspend,
remove, or reprimand attorneys for improper conduct, or for
any acts affecting "the substantial rights of the parties."8 Mis-
conduct that can not be removed from the minds of the jurors
by corrective action of the court will usually result in a mistrial.
For instance, a judge in his discretion may prohibit an attorney
from interrogating a witness. The Supreme Court of Alabama
has set forth guides to assist its courts in determining whether
the probative value of interrogation is outweighed by: (1) an
undue amount of time; (2) a substantial prejudice resulting;
(3) a confusion of the issues; (4) the misleading of the jury;
(5) unfairly surprising an opponent who could not reasonably
anticipate evidence being offered.9 The trial judge also has the
right to question witnesses. He does so in order to clarify testi-
mony, amplify details, or to supply omissions.10 However, it is
not proper for him to conduct an extended examination," nor
to interrupt counsel threatening the witness with jail if he does
not speak louder.1'
For all practical purposes the judge must see to it that
counsel does not create a trial surcharged with passion or preju-
dice.18 When necessary, contempt of court charges may be
brought against offending counsel. For example, in a personal
injury case14 repeated references to defendant's syphilis in
childhood were improper. Asking questions which were irrele-
vant and repetitious in relation to the issues of the case was
sufficient for counsel to be charged with contempt of court
6 Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 273, 276-81 (1882); Ex parte Secombe, 60
U. S. (19 How.), 9, 13 (1856).
7 Ohio R. C. 4705.02 (1958).
8 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61, 28 U. S. C. A.
9 Phoenix Insurance Co. of New York v. Leonard, 119 S. 2d 217 (Ala.,
1960).
10 People v. Rigney, 3 Cal. Rptr. 855 (Calif. App., 1960).
11 People v. Cole, 349 Mich. 175, 84 N. W. 2d 711 (1957); Shandor v. Lischer,
349 Mich. 556, 84 N. W. 2d 816 (1957).
12 State v. Lawrence, 162 Ohio St. 412, 123 N. E. 271 (1954); See note,
7 West. Res. L. R. 274 (1955).
13 Jones v. M.-N. Banking Co., 132 Ohio St. 341 (1937); Addison v. Tessier,
62 N. M. 120, 305 P. 2d 1067 (1957).





and fined $250. In the case of Re Sacher15 severe charges of
serious misconduct resulted in disbarment. Usually, disbarment
or contempt proceedings are brought only after the court has
repeatedly warned the offender and he has ignored the court's
rulings. It would appear that a court might merely reprimand
the attorney for misconduct if it is the result of fervor of the
controversy rather than of deliberate contempt.16
Objections of Opposing Counsel
It is axiomatic that testimony, in order to be admissible,
must relate and connect with the transaction it is intended to
explain. This connection must not be "remote, or forced, strained,
or mere conjectural conclusion."' 7 It must have a reasonable
tendency to prove or disprove a material fact in issue.' 8
Besides the judge, opposing counsel has a right to object
to inadmissible testimony. The purpose of the objection is to
make clear to the court the grounds relied upon by the objector.
If a party believes himself or his case to be prejudiced by im-
proper questions asked of a witness, he should ask for a mis-
trial.19 A recent decision" held that if an objection to a question
of the opposing counsel was not made until some time after
the responsive answer by the witness, the objection came too
late, and could not be raised as an issue to permit an appellate
review based upon the prejudicial effect of the question. The
reason for the appellate court's denying a review is that counsel
may have been gambling on a favorable verdict. The weight of
evidence being apparently unfavorable to him, he had sought to
raise an objection to a prior question, hoping thereby to be
granted a new trial.2 1 However, if the misconduct of counsel
is so grossly improper and prejudicial that neither retraction by
offending counsel nor rebuke by the trial court would destroy
the prejudicial effect on the jury, the above rule would not
apply.22 A New Jersey court 23 has made a distinction between
15 In re Sacher, 206 F. 2d 358 (2d Cir., 1953).
16 United States v. Sacher, 182 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir., 1950).
17 Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Blackwell, 221 Ala. 225, 128 S. 389 (1930).
Is Ibid.
19 Morrow v. U. S., 101 F. 2d 654 (7th Cir., 1939), cert. den. 59 S. Ct. 836,
307 U. S. 628, 83 L. Ed. 1511.
20 Posey v. St. Clair County, 116 S. 2d 743 (Ala. 1959).
21 Jones v. Hogan, 351 P. 2d 153 (Wash., 1960).
22 Colquette v. Williams, 264 Ala. 214, 86 S. 2d 381 (1956); Anderson v.
(Continued on next page)
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questions prejudicially objectionable and ones irrelevant. The
court stated that if counsel objects to an irrelevant question, he
may not contend on appeal that the question posed to the witness
was prejudicially injected into the case.
Counsel's Conduct Toward Witness
As has been noted, the trial attorney in handling a witness
must be cognizant of what the judge may rule as proper or im-
proper, and what opposing counsel may object to as prejudicial
or irrelevant. What acts are sufficient to be termed misconduct?
And if misconduct results, how does the court react?
Counsel must necessarily subordinate his methods of handl-
ing witnesses to the court's rules, and to how the judges enforce
such rules. On most occasions, counsel is allowed great latitude
in presenting his case. However, deliberately violating rules of
practice constitutes misconduct.2 4 The misfeasance may be single
or comprised of many details. It may be inferred after repeated
admonitions by the judge. On the other hand, unintentional acts,
such as asking irrelevant questions, may be misconduct also. The
basic criterion of most courts in determining what is misconduct
appears to be to ask what effect, if any, did such conduct have on
the jury in reaching a verdict? Some courts25 will set aside a
judgment if, in all reasonable probability, the jury's verdict was
influenced. The Supreme Court of South Carolina 26 upheld a
trial court's decision on the basis that the testimony was not so
incompetent or prejudicial, and was not intended to influence
the jury. The court, in Pope v. Boston & M. R. R., 27 stated that
whether counsel was guilty of misconduct was a question of
fact. Alabama courts 28 have held that the verdict is a decisive
(Continued from preceding page)
State, 209 Ala. 36, 95 S. 171, 179 (1922); Harvey Ragland Co. v. Newton, 268
Ala. 192 (1958); Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Gambrell, 262 Ala. 290,
78 S. 2d 619 (1955).
23 Troast v. Lascari, 59 N. J. Super. 110, 157 A. 2d 346 (1960).
24 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Payne, 133 Ky. 539, 118 S. W. 352, 19 Am. Cas.
294 (1909); Dermony v. Fanny, 56 P. 2d 1150 (Ore., 1936).
25 Twachtman v. Connelly, 106 F. 2d 501 (6th Cir., 1939); New Amsterdam
Casualty Co. v. Harrington, 274 F. 2d 323 (5th Cir., 1960); Hansen v. Boots,
41 S. D. 96, 168 N. W. 798 (1918).
26 Welch v. New York Life Insur. Co., 189 S. E. 809 (S. Car., 1936).
27 Pope v. Boston & M. R. R., 79 N. H. 52, 104 A. 403 (1918).
28 Alabama Power Co. v. Powers, 252 Ala. 49, 39 S. 2d 402 (1949); Southern
Railway Co. v. Stallings, 268 Ala. 463, 101 S. 2d 873 (1959): Authority
vested in courts to disturb verdict of a jury on ground of excessive dam-




factor in determining whether the misconduct had sufficient
effect on the jury. These cases have held that if the verdict
is excessive, and if misconduct occurred on the face of the record,
the court will allow a new trial. A Florida court 29 held that if
the cumulative impact of prejudicial conduct impairs "a calm and
dispassionate" consideration of the evidence, the judgment should
be reversed. Yet in another jurisdiction,30 the court did not find
such clear and convincing prejudice of counsel's questioning in-
tended to mislead the jury as to warrant a new trial. In Ohio,
the Supreme Court3 ' held that the permission by the trial court
of misconduct is prejudicial error which should be reversed un-
less it affirmatively appears that by instructions of the court,
or retraction of counsel, or by both methods, the prejudicial tend-
ency of misconduct has been averted. As mentioned previously,
courts of appeal rely on the sound discretion of the trial court.
They will not ordinarily reverse the trial courts unless on the
face of the record the trial judge abused his discretion in allow-
ing misconduct or error.3 2
Misconduct of an attorney in handling the witness is based
on his violating rules of procedure, evidence, and proper court
room decorum. He may be admonished for shaking a finger in
the face of a witness, 33 referring to a word like insurance,34 or
ridiculing an uneducated witness as to his ungrammatical
speech.3 5 These acts are misconduct, yet they are distinguish-
able. Waving a finger is improper behavior which ordinarily
would not cause undue prejudice in the jury sufficient for a
mistrial. On the other hand the courts have held that inadvertent
use of the word insurance can cause prejudice in the jury.
Ridiculing a witness may bring about adverse effects. The wit-
ness may feel coerced or so confused that his answers are not
responsive to the question. Similarly, questions may cause em-
barrassment, shame, or anger, leading the witness to such
29 Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. v. Strickland, 88 S. 2d 519 (Fla., 1956);
Apalachicola N. Railroad Co. v. Tyus, 114 S. 2d 33, 37 (Fla. App., 1959).
30 Friesland v. City of Litchfield, 24 Ill. App. 2d 390, 164 N. E. 2d 606
(1960).
31 Cleveland, Painesville & Eastern Railroad v. Pritschau, 69 Ohio St. 438
(1904).
32 Uhl v. Echols Transfer Co., 238 F. 2d 760, 764 (5th Cir., 1956).
33 E. G. Buchseib, Inc. v. Frey, 20 Ohio Abs. 205 (1935).
34 McAdams v. Blosser, 31 Ohio Abs. 92 (1938).
35 Supra, note 31.
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demeanor and utterances that the impression produced does not
give true perspective to his testimony.3
The words which sometimes appear to be used interchange-
ably to describe misconduct are: improper, extraneous, irrelevant,
and incompetent. When applied to an attorney's questioning, the
words as a group mean that such statements are not germane
to the issues before the court and are: (1) violative of rules of
procedure or evidence, (2) thereby sidetracking or confusing
the jury in reaching a just verdict. While these terms are used
for deliberate or unintentional conduct, courts tend to hold that
misconduct is a deliberate act on the part of counsel.3
7
Most courts state that misconduct by counsel arises when
improper, repetitious interrogation of a witness occurs, having
an adverse effect upon the jury. For example, if the question is
so stated that one is led to believe that the facts assumed in it ac-
tually exist, it gives a false impression of trying to keep facts from
the jury.38  Ordinarily, the propounding of an improper ques-
tion is not sufficient to warrant setting a judgment aside or
granting a mistrial, unless it is fairly apparent that counsel acted
in bad faith and opposing counsel was substantially prejudiced.3 9
In Brook v. Gilbert,40 a policeman at the scene of an acci-
dent drew a chalk circle on the ground to show the point of im-
pact. He had not been present, but took the stories of others
as to the point of the impact. He then took photographs of the
chalked area. The attorney, by 13 repetitious questions regarding
the photograph, attempted to convey the impression that the
chalk circle was the actual place of impact. The Supreme Court
of Iowa held that the results of such repetitious questions,
though objections were sustained, could not blot from the minds
of the jurors the fact that the circle was the point of impact, and
therefore such conduct was held prejudicial.
Similar facts are found in Hulburd v. Worthington.4 1 In this
personal injury action, despite admonitions and the sustaining
of objections, counsel sought to convey the impression that a
police officer had issued a citation for violation of the law, when
36 Wigmore on Evidence, 781 (3rd Ed., 1940).
37 Mandella v. Marino, 61 R. 1. 163, 200 A. 478, 479 (1938); State v. Leach,
60 Me. 58, 11 Am. Rep. 172 (1872).
38 Supra, note 25.
39 Dyess v. W. W. Olde & Co., 132 F. 2d 972, 974 (10th Cir., 1942).
40 Brook v. Gilbert, 250 Ia. 1164, 98 N. W. 2d 309 (1959).




in fact he had not once done so. However, in the Hulburd case,
though the court found such behavior to be misconduct, the
court held that there was not sufficient prejudice to affect the
verdict. The court further commented that, despite the miscon-
duct of counsel, the court would not set aside the verdict or
grant a new trial merely for the sake of punishing him. Are
these two cases distinguishable? The facts are different, but per-
haps the distinguishing factor lies in the inherent and broad dis-
cretionary powers of the trial court system itself. If on the face
of the record, the trial court has used sound discretion, an ap-
pellate court will not reverse it, for the trial court decided and
weighed the circumstances as they occurred.
Sometimes both the judge and the attorney are at fault. In
an action for false arrest and imprisonment and for malicious
prosecution, the judgment was reversed when misconduct was
twice repeated.4 2 Counsel, during cross-examination of a wit-
ness, asked about an interrogation room to which the plaintiff
had been taken by a peace officer. The witness replied that it
was a room in which they "put you through the mill." The at-
torney, dissatisfied with the answer, asked: "Did they call it a
rubber hose room?" Opposing counsel objected, and the judge,
being either non-attentive or hard of hearing, asked the court
reporter to repeat the statements. The appellate court reversed
the judgment, stating that the jury had probably been influenced
by having heard the statements twice.
In some instances, under the rules of evidence, refreshing
the mind of the witness is allowed. 43 However, showing a witness
a photograph and then asking him to testify from memory what
was on the photograph was held to amount to giving the answer
before the question was asked.44 In another case,45 it was
prejudicial error when, under the pretense of refreshing a wit-
ness's memory, counsel read evidence previously given, and then
asked the witness to recall certain facts in it. While it is improper
to put answers in a witness's mouth, it is also improper to ask
opinions and conclusions of him. For example, such questions
as: "why did an accident occur?" or "could the accident have
been avoided?" are questions of pure conjecture. It is for the
42 Kraft v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 348 P. 2d 239 (Ore., 1959).
43 In re Estate of Kelly, 399 Pa. 153, 159 A. 2d 739 (1960).
44 Kavazanjian v. Brookhatten Trucking Co., 20 Misc. 2d 780, 199 N. Y. S.
2d 750 (1960).
45 People v. Thomas, 359 Mich. 251, 102 N. W. 2d 475 (1960).
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jury to determine the ultimate fact whether the conduct was
careless, reckless, or negligent.40 This kind of misconduct in-
fringes upon the rights of the jury, because the witnesses' only
duty is to state evidentiary facts.47
Statements whose sole purpose is to arouse sympathy in the
jury may be misconduct. Thus counsel asked in a Federal Em-
ployment Liability Act suit48 how many children the witness
had. Or sympathy can be swayed by character witnesses. One
attorney, in his eagerness to get character witnesses before a
jury, disobeyed the judge's rulings, resulting in contempt charges
being lodged against him. In Re Schofield,4 9 the judge ordered
counsel not to call certain persons to the witness stand. Never-
theless counsel asked leave to call the witnesses. The judge re-
iterated his directive. In spite of this the attorney wheeled about
and, addressing the court room, said: "The character witnesses
who were asked to be here are excused. Thank you all very
much for coming. Thank you Judge Connelly, Thank you Judge
McDevitt, Thank you Judge ------.-" The court held that coun-
sel expressly violated its rulings. If he wished to challenge the
legality of the ruling he could have done so by appeal. Con-
tempt of court proceedings resulted in a public reprimand and
censure.
Perhaps the worst misconduct of an attorney is his allow-
ing,50 or soliciting,51 a witness to give false testimony. This, of
course, is a violation of his oath, and is conduct sufficient for
disbarment.
Sometimes a problem arises when an attorney testifies for
his client. The Canons of Professional Ethics state that "When
46 Buehman v. Smelker, 68 P. 2d 946 (Ariz., 1937).
47 Ibid.
48 Affileck v. Chicago & N. W. Ry Co., 253 F. 2d 249 (7th Cir., 1958).
49 In re Schofield, 362 Pa. 201, 66 A. 2d 675 (1949); Neff v. Morrison, 191 Pa.
Super. 36, 155 A. 2d 397 (1959).
50 In re Barach, 279 Pa. 89, 123 A. 727 (1924); People ex rel. Attorney
General v. Beattie, 137 Ill. 533, 27 N. E. 1096 (1891); State v. Rush Circuit
Court, 234 Ind. 650, 130 N. E. 2d 460, 461 (1955).
Drinker, H. S. Legal Ethics 75 (1953): As chairman of the Standing
Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar
Association, in his treatise on legal points to the forceful language in
People ex rel. Attorney General, supra, on p. 1103: "The lawyer's duty is of
a double character. He owes to his client the duty of fidelity but he also
owes a duty of good faith and honorable dealing to the judicial tribunals
before whom he practices his profession. * * * He violates his oath of office
when he resorts to deception, or permits his clients to do so."




a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal
matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and
the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel.
Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should
avoid testifying in Court in behalf of his client." 52 It would
appear at least in one state that an attorney's appearance in court
in the dual capacity of counsel and witness was disfavored.
53
One court stated that this was improper conduct, but insufficient
to authorized disciplinary action.5 4 Another court in the same
state held that the attorney who assumed such a role does so at
"very great detriment to the credibility of his testimony." "
On the whole, courts seem to allow a good deal of leeway
in an attorney's behavior. One court stated that, as long as the
lawyer is acting conscientiously, although he may be mistaken
as to the law, he should not be charged with misconduct.56 This
is true even when he reasonably and respectfully insists that his
views are correct,57 or exaggerates the facts,58 or when his con-
duct is the result of zeal for his client's cause and is not inten-
tional wrongdoing. 59 However, he can not claim inadvertence °
when it appears that he acted intentionally, or claim on appeal0 '
that the court already chastised him when admonishing him for
asking improper questions.
Conclusion
In setting out some of the basic factors affecting the handling
of witnesses by an attorney in the court room, it has been noted
that the trial judge has broad discretionary powers, enabling
him to reprimand, declare a mistrial, or bring contempt pro-
ceedings against an offender. On the other hand, opposing coun-
sel has a right to make timely objections to improper questions.
Both of these officers serve to restrain or prevent misconduct.
52 Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 18 (1957).
53 In re Obartuch, 386 Ill. 323, 54 N. E. 2d 470 (1944).
54 Ibid.
55 Crescio v. Crescio, 365 Ill. 393, 6 N. E. 2d 628 (1937).
56 Carroll v. Krause, 15 N. E. 2d 323 (Ill. App., 1938).
57 Ibid.
58 Bicker v. Schmidlapp, 30 Ohio N. P. 483 (1933).
59 Maland v. Tesdall, 5 N. W. 2d 327 (Ia., 1942).
60 Fike v. Grant, 39 Ariz. 549, 8 P. 2d 242 (1932).
61 Sheldon v. Schmidt, 351 P. 2d 288 (Colo., 1960).
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If they fail, the appellate courts are the forum for redressing any
injustice which may have occurred.
The tests used by courts to decide how conduct affects the
verdict vary. Ordinarily the misconduct of an attorney in han-
dling the witnesses is based upon his violation of the rules of pro-
cedure, evidence, and proper court room decorum. The net effect
is that an attorney is allowed great latitude in presenting his
case; however not such broad tactics or techniques as to distract
or unduly influence a jury, so that a verdict is the by-product of
misconduct rather than of the actual issues. Needless to say, the
court's main purpose is to insure that a trial is fair and honest
and that a just verdict results. In achieving this objective, the
basic criterion of the courts is what effect, if any, did the conduct
have upon the verdict of the jury?
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol10/iss3/8
